there is neither a President nor Vice President." '2 But serious questions lurk at a deeper level-questions about the constitutionality of the succession statute itself. In this essay, we conclude that the best reading of the Constitution's text, history, and structure excludes federal legislators from the line of presidential succession. Our most important reasoning is structural: If legislators are in line to fill a vacant Oval Office, a pervasive conflict of interest will warp their judicial roles in presidential and vice-presidential impeachment proceedings; and similar pressures will tempt lawmakers to betray our Constitution's careful rejection of a Parliamentary/Prime Minister Model of presidential selection.
I. THE CONSTITUTION
The core issue is whether the current federal succession statute, 3 U.S.C. section 19, is a valid exercise of congressional power under the Constitution's Succession Clause, which states:
In Case of the Removal of the President from Office, or of his Death, Resignation, or Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties of the said Office, the from the civil/military distinction)-the modifying terms "of," "under," and "under the Authority of" are essentially synonymous. And if the term "Officer" in the Succession Clause is merely shorthand for any of these five longer formulations, then federal legislators are constitutionally ineligible for succession: The Incompatibility Clause of Article I, Section 6 makes clear that sitting members of Congress cannot hold "any Office under the United States." 9 "Officers" of or under the United States thus means certain members of the executive and judicial branches, but not legislators-the legacy of an earlier view sharply distinguishing the "people's" representatives in Parliament from "crown" officers in executive and judicial positions. The Article II Commission Clause confirms this reading: "[A]ll the [executive and judicial] Officers of the United States" receive a commission from the President,' 0 but federal legislators have never needed nor received such commissions to serve in the House or Senate." Further support for this officer/legislator distinction comes from the Impeachment Clause, which makes "all civil Officers of the United States" subject to removal. 12 In the William Blount impeachment case in 1798, the Senate correctly rejected the idea that its members were "civil Officers" within the meaning of the Constitution, and thus subject to impeachment. 13 As future Supreme Court Justice James Iredell had put the point in constitutional ratification debates a decade earlier: "[W]ho ever heard of impeaching a member of the legislature?"' 14 14. 4 THE DEBATES IN TmE SEvERAL STATE CoNvENTioNs ON THE ADOPTION oF THE FEDERAL CONsrTrUIoN, As REcosmMNDED By THE GENERAL CoNVEMoN AT PHILADELPHIA iN 1787, at 127 (Jonathan Elliot ed.) (2d ed. Washington 1836). To remove unfit legislators from government, the Constitution provides a specially tailored alternative to impeachment: expulsion by a two-thirds vote of one's own House. U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2. Expulsion gives each House exclusive control over its own membership; impeachment of legislators, by contrast, would embroil each House in the other's controversies.
This reading of Article II's Impeachment Clause also has implications for the Impeachment Sanctions Clause of Article I, Section 3, which declares that conviction in an impeachment case can disqualify a person from "any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United States." Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 7. By parity of logic with the Impeachment Clause as expounded in the Blount affair, a convicted executive or judicial "Officer" could be barred from executive or judicial "Office," but remain eligible for a congressional seat since, by definition, it is a nonOfficer position. Cf Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 520 n.41 (1969) (noting but not reaching this issue).
United States," nor (to the extent that there is any difference) "Officers of the United States.' '15 There is considerable historical evidence that the Constitution's drafters used the term "Officer" in the Succession Clause as shorthand for "Officer of the United States." In fact, early versions of the clause approved by the Philadelphia Convention explicitly employed the longer formulation.' 6 According to James Madison's notes, the Convention understood that only" 'officers' of the U.S." (the italics are Madison's) would be eligible. 17 A later style committee deleted the words "of the United States," but no evidence suggests that this style change was meant to change meaning i s In discussing Congress' first attempt to implement the Succession Clause, the Presidential Succession Act of 1792, 19 Madison suggested that legislators were not "officers, in the constitutional sense" (again the italics are his) and that Congress "certainly err [ed] " in allowing legislators to succeed to the Presidency. 20 This textual argument against legislative succession, while forceful, is not quite a slam dunk. In two places, the Constitution uses the term "Officers," without more, and in a way that clearly includes federal legislators. In particular, Article I, Section 2 provides that " [t] he House of Representatives shall chuse their Speaker and other Officers"; 2 ' and Section 3 similarly provides that " [t] he Senate shall chuse their other Officers, and also a President pro tempore." 22 Thus, the Speaker is an "Officer" in at least one constitutional sense-an "Officer" of the legislature. If the Succession Clause's open-ended reference to "Officer[s]" includes every person whom the Constitution at some point labels an "Officer" (and not just those who are Officers under or of the United States), then the Speaker might be constitutionally eligible for succession.
15. For a discussion of the distinction between executive officers and legislators in a criminal context, see Burton v. United States, 202 U.S. 344, 369-70 (1906) (holding that a U.S. Senator was not removed "ipsofacto" by criminal conviction, because he was not an officer "under the govemment of the United States" within the meaning of the criminal statute). By contrast, criminal conviction often automatically effects removal from executive or judicial offices. For At first glance, this reading of the Succession Clause seems textually plausible. But anyone who embraces it must address Article VI's oath requirement, which also speaks in terms of generic "Officers. '23 And Article VI's reference to "Officers" ranges beyond federal officials, and explicitly includes "Officers ... of the several States." '24 Thus, if the Succession Clause really does use the term "Officer" in its broadest constitutional sense, then, as a textual matter, Congress could theoretically designate a state government official to fill an empty White House. While the Constitution nowhere explicitly forecloses this result, it seems odd given: (1) the Framers' clear intent to create a stronger and more national central government than had previously existed; (2) the obvious state favoritism and disuniformity such a succession rule would invite (allowing Congress to designate, say, the Governor of Virginia as the ex officio successor); 25 and (3) the existence of another equally (if not more) plausible reading identified above.
26
And the Article VI "Officer" clause cuts against legislative succession in yet another way. Although its oath requirement applies to all state governmental figures, Article VI explicitly distinguishes between "Members of the several State Legislatures," on the one hand, and "executive and judicial Officers... of the several States" on the other. So too, it distinguishes "Senators and Representatives" from "Officers. 26. It might be argued that an intermediate reading of the Succession Clause is possible-one that insists that a successor be a federal, rather than state, Officer, without requiring the successor to be an "Officer of the United States." Though analytically possible, this superfine distinction lacks strong textual support, and runs up against important historical and structural objections. Historically, we must remember that some of the most prominent proponents of legislative eligibility also believed in state officer eligibility. See note 25 supra (discussing Elbridge Gerry's thoughts on presidential succession). Structurally, we should remember that, prior to the Seventeenth Amendment, a Senator was seen as an agent of his state government in some ways. Happily, we need not be limited to the isolated constitutional provisions identified above when we decide which reading of the Succession Clause ought to prevail. Instead, we must remember that it is "a [C]onstitution we are expounding." 29 Within the Constitution inheres a structure, a set of themes and overarching principles that furnish backdrops against which any single provision must be interpreted. At least five structural arguments militate against reading the Succession Clause to include the Speaker of the House. We present these five in two clusters, beginning with three basic principles of separation of powers before considering a pair of practical and logistical issues.
Separation of powers.
The ban on congressional office-holding and the resignation problem. Madison clearly thought that a Cabinet official could keep his Cabinet post while serving as Acting President. 39 And so said Senator Hoar, author of the Succession Act of 1886,40 and various other members of Congress, in debates over the Act. 4 1 As adopted, the Act provided for Cabinet succession but did not require resignation from the Cabinet before assumption of the Presidency. Although as a practical matter it might seem hard to serve as both Acting President and, say, Secretary of State, one's duties in the latter capacity could largely be delegated to undersecretaries. 42 Indeed, Madison, Hoar, and many others went a step further and insisted that an ascending officer not only could, but must retain his predicate office in order to become and remain Acting President. 4 In their view, the predicate office was the basis for ascension; when it lapsed, so did one's entitlement to be the "Officer [who] shall ... act as President" under the Succession Clause. 45 Put another way, Congress can designate only officers, not private citizens, to act as President; the moment an officer resigns, he becomes a mere citizen and is thus ineligible to succeed to or remain in the Oval Office.
In effect, Madison and others argued that Congress could annex presidential powers only ex officio-that is, to some fixed office, not a person. 4 It might be argued that we should distinguish between House Representatives and the Speaker, and that the Speaker need not even be a member of the House. Thus, even though the Incompatibility Clause requires that one resign as Representative to become President, one need not resign as the Speaker. Though clever, this argument fails. For starters, one could counterargue that when the House chooses "their Speaker" under Article I, Section 2, they must choose one of themselves. Historically, the Speaker and President pro tempore have always been sitting legislators.
In any event, the clear logic of Article I prevents a person from acting simultaneously as President and presiding officer of the legislature, even if he is not a Senator or Representative: The Vice President-who is not a Senator-may not preside over the Senate "when he shall exercise the Office of President of the United States." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 5. Most important, a Speaker holds his
[Vol. 48:113
HeinOnline --48 Stan. L. Rev. 120 [1995] [1996] Speakership is, under Madison's reading, to pull the constitutional rug out from under one's own feet, destroying one's status as an "Officer" eligible to "act as President" under the Succession Clause (assuming a Speaker even qualifies as a Succession Clause "Officer"). And so, on this logic, the Speaker is ineligible to act as President whether or not he resigns as Speaker.
In the end, the text and structure of the Constitution permit multiple officeholding within the executive branch, but clearly ban parliamentary-style executive/legislative blending. The clear implications of all this argue strongly that members of Congress cannot be "officers" within the meaning of the Succession Clause.
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Impeachment process integrity and the conflict of interest problem. A second and critically important structural theme is the Constitution's pervasive fear of conflict of interest. Concern that individuals not judge their own causes infused both the writings of the Founders 50 and the constitutional framework itself. An important textual embodiment of the self-dealing concern appears in the Emoluments Clause: "No Senator or Representative shall, during the Time for which he was elected, be appointed to any civil Office under the Authority of the United States, which shall have been created, or the Emoluments whereof shall have been encreased during such time. '51 The clear purpose of this provision was to remove the direct, immediate, and personal conflict of interest federal legislators might otherwise have when enacting laws creating (or making more lucrative) any federal executive or judicial offices. To understand the reasons for and import of this provision, we must ask who "office" at the pleasure of the House. If he must remain in this office in order to act as President, as the Madisonian reading insists, then his service as President wholly depends on the will of a simple House majority, in obvious violation of the Constitution's rejection of the Walpole Prime Minister Model. See text accompanying notes 69-76 infra. Similar logic applies to the President pro tempore. 49 . Even if one rejects Madison's ex officio reading that a Cabinet officer must keep his old post, the clear constitutional fact that he may do so-while the Speaker may not-argues strongly against legislative succession in situations where a President suffers a temporary disability. By textual implication, if legislators fail to qualify as officers for temporary disability purposes, neither should they qualify in cases of death or removal. It should be obvious why the Constitution does not permit the Vice President to participate in an impeachment proceeding whose result could vault him into the Oval Office: He would be presiding over a judicial proceeding in which he had a huge, direct, immediate, and personal stake. In effect, the Vice President would be judging his own cause. (For similar reasons, the Constitution expressly prohibits the Vice President, when serving as Acting President, from presiding over the Senate; otherwise, if the Senate sat to impeach the Acting President, the Vice President would be presiding in his own trial.) 56 This simple and obvious conflict-of-interest problem has far-reaching implications for the question of presidential succession in general and the current federal succession statute in particular. Simply put, section 19 may warp the judgment of the Speaker and the President pro tempore when they are called upon to participate judicially in impeachment proceedings against the President and/or Vice President. (Recall that the Constitution vests the sole power to "impeach"--to indict-the President and/or Vice President in the House, 57 acting as a kind of grand jury; and vests the sole power to "try" the case in the Senate, 58 acting as judge and petit jury.) Successful impeachment and conviction of either the President or Vice President would materially enhance the likelihood that section 19 would come into play. The structure of the Constitution simply does not permit participants in the impeachment process to have such a direct, immediate, personal stake in the outcome.
55. Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 4 ("The Vice President of the United States shall be President of the Senate."). During debates over the Constitution, considerable controversy arose over the "amphibious" nature of the Vice President, an impeachable executive branch officer, id. art. II, § 4, with legislative duties, id. art. I, § 3, cl. 4. Given that this relatively minor blending of executive and legislative powers caused so much concern, it is hard to believe that the far more troubling blend embodied in legislative succession to the Presidency-the Chief Executive Office-would not have inspired debate. Seemingly, the Founders never truly expected that legislators might claim to be eligible "Officers" under the Succession Clause. (We are indebted to Gary Lawson for this point.)
56. See text accompanying note 32 supra; note 59 infra. 57. U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 2, cl. 5. 58. Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 6. 59. This general principle suggests that, because of the role he is constitutionally assigned in impeachment, the Chief Justice himself is not eligible for presidential succession, even though he is an "Officer of the United States." (Put another way, the clear logic of the Chief Justice Clause supplements the words of the Succession Clause and renders the Chief Justice ineligible.) See 2 AiNNA.s OF CONG. 1911 (Jan. 13, 1791) (citing Rep. Livermore's reservations about including the Chief Justice as a succession candidate because of his impeachment role); Hamlin, supra note 43, at 187 (noting 1856 Judiciary Committee recommendations that the Chief Justice follow the President pro tempore and Speaker in the succession line, provided he did not preside at the President's impeachment). General conflict-of-interest principles similarly preclude the Vice President from presiding over his ovm impeachment proceedings. (This too is a rather clear entailment of the Chief Justice Clause and the Acting President Clause of Article I, Section 3, Clause 5, which here might be re-labelled the "Mandatory Vice-Presidential Recusal Clauses." See text accompanying notes 32 & 56 supra.)
It could be argued that the best way to deal with the pervasive conflict-of-interest problem is not to read the Succession Clause straightforwardly as excluding all legislators, but to read the Constitution generally to require any legislators mentioned in § 19 to recuse themselves from presidential and vicepresidential impeachment proceedings. But this limited recusal scheme does not address the fact that legislative succession corrupts the whole legislative body, not just individual leaders. Worse still, it [Vol. 48:113
HeinOnline --48 Stan. L. Rev. 122 [1995] [1996] It is true, of course, that the impeachment process has a political component. But impeachment is also clearly ajudicial proceeding, 60 and the rules of judicial ethics apply. For instance, Senators must be "on Oath or Affirmation" when sitting as a court of impeachment. 6 1 And the most basic rule of judicial ethics is that a person may not judge her own case.
Concern about self-dealing in the impeachment and succession contexts is more than just paranoia. Consider, for example, the 1868 impeachment proceedings of President Andrew Johnson, who succeeded to the Presidency after President Lincoln's assassination in 1865. At that time (and until the passage of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment in 1967) no constitutional means existed for filling a vice-presidential vacancy; 62 thus Senate conviction of President Johnson would have triggered the federal succession statute then in effect-the Act of 1792-which placed the President pro tempore first in line. 63 Senator Benjamin Wade, the President pro tempore at the time, vigorously participated in the trial and voted to convict Johnson. 64 Indeed, Wade had apparently already selected his new Cabinet when he cast his impeachment vote. 65 Needless to say, Wade's participation in the trial was soundly criticized at the time, 66 and was one of the factors that led Congress in 1886 to remove the President pro tempore and the Speaker from the statutory succession line, providing instead for Cabinet succession. 67 In 1947, a misguided Congress repealed the 1886 warps the entire presidential selection process created by the Constitution. See text accompanying notes 69-76 infra. Moreover, legislators may not recuse themselves when they should. See text accompanying notes 62-65 infra (discussing the Johnson impeachment). A recalcitrant President pro tempore might also claim that mandatory recusal would deprive his state of its constitutionally guaranteed "equal Suffrage in the Senate." See U.S. CoNSr. art V; 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1903 (Jan. 10, 1791) (detailing remarks of Rep. Smith on how a State would be deprived of a Senate vote should the President pro tempore be allowed to succeed to the Presidency); id, at 1913 (Jan. 13, 1791) (same); FEEacK, supra note 20, at 114 (noting objections to President pro tempore Wade's participation in the Johnson impeachment and counterarguments that his exclusion would deprive Ohio of its vote).
Further, if the suggestion is made that courts can require recusal, we must acknowledge that especially tricky problems arise from judicial interference into the impeachment process, because in impeachment the Senate acts as a court. Other courts must thus observe the rules of comity and res judicata when asked to enjoin legislative leaders from trying an impeachment. Judicial enforcement of our reading of the Succession Clause would at least avoid these special justiciability problems.
60. See text accompanying note 58 supra. Note also that Article I speaks in terms of "Judgment" in "Cases" of Impeachment, and gives the Senate the exclusive power to "try" and "convict[ ]" in such "Cases." U.S. CONsr. art I, § 3, cl. law and enacted the current version of section 19, reestablishing legislative succession, with the Speaker first in line, followed by the President pro tempore.
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The Electoral College Model and the problem of creeping prime ministerialization. Closely related to the self-dealing concern is another core separation of powers issue: the Constitution's fundamental rejection of a parliamentary system in which the legislature, or its dominant party, elects its own leader as Prime Minister/Chief Executive Officer. The problem in 1868 was not just that Ben Wade sat as a judge, and, in effect, ruled for himself; it was that the entire Senate and the party Wade led all sat as judges, and many ruled for their own leader-ruled, in effect, to anoint themselves presidential electors. By making Wade, a legislator, eligible to succeed to the Presidency, the 1792 Act corrupted the entire judicial proceeding. The Act tempted the whole Senate to act in a personal, partisan, and political-rather than judicial-manner.
Worse yet, the 1792 Act tempted the legislature to exercise a political power the Constitution took great pains to deny: the power to pick its own leader as President. As we have noted, one of the most basic decisions at Philadelphia was to break with the parliamentary Prime Minister Model represented by Robert Walpole: Congress would not have free rein to pick a President. Instead, the Constitution adopted an Electoral College Model, under which an assortment of electors independent of Congress would pick a President. Article II went so far as to bar individual members of Congress from serving as presidential electors. 69 It is true that if the electors deadlocked, Congress would resolve the impasse, but only by picking among those candidates with the most electoral college votes. 70 Congress would not have complete discretion merely to pick its own leader as President. 7 1 This basic Electoral College Model was preserved by the Twelfth Amendment, refined by the Twentieth, and extended by the Twenty-Fifth, which requires Congressional approval of a President's nominee to fill a vice-presidential vacancy, but does not allow Congress to fill that vacancy itself. 75 However, in both instances, Congress is limited to choosing among those "nominated" by continental institutions 76 outside of Congress-the Electoral College or (in the case of vice-presidential vacancy) the Presidency. Consistent with the basic spirit of the Electoral College model, we should read the term "Officer" in the Succession Clause to include presidential "nominees"-executive and judicial officers appointed via presidential nomination and commissionbut not congressional party leaders whom the Congress itself selects.
Logistics.
The "where" problem. Consider next the Constitution's concern with geography. "Geography preoccupied the founding generation ....
[It] ramified in every direction, influencing virtually every major issue considered by the Philadelphia Convention... . -77 Where to locate various government personnel and institutions obsessed those who wrote and ratified the Constitution, largely because location does affect (and did so much more in 1787) the smooth running of government. For example, impeachment trials-suits that may tend to distract government actors from discharging their duties-were explicitly located in the Senate, in the nation's capital, in part because that is where geographic disruption would be minimized. 78 Similarly, part of Article III's underlying logic is geographic: The requirement that suits involving ambassadors be tried in the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, in the nation's capital, reflected a concern over the disruption of ambassadors' official duties. 7 9 Given all this, we must ask what kind of event would cause the single largest disruption in the smooth operation of the federal government? Clearly the answer is the kind of catastrophe that triggers the succession statute-that is, November 1995]
HeinOnline --48 Stan. L. Rev. 125 1995-1996 an event that deprives the country of its two elected executive officials. In construing the scope of the Succession Clause, shouldn't we consider the geographic location of a would-be successor? At the Founding, high level executive officials, especially Cabinet members, were most likely to be in Washington during a time of national crisis. Diligent federal legislators, ineluding the Speaker, tended to, and were supposed to, split their time between the capital and the people they represented. Indeed, in the early Republic, Americans expected that legislators would typically meet in short sessions and quickly return back home to live (like everyone else) under the laws just made. Article I's Arrest Clause explicitly focused on this geographic reality in its reference to federal legislators "going to and returning from" the capital. 80 During In sum, whether we consider the deep implications of the Constitution's separation of powers and its rejection of a Parliamentary/Prime Minister model or focus on the more mundane, practical issues of time and place, we reach the same conclusion: The Constitution's structure strongly suggests that legislators are simply not Succession Clause "Officers."
C. Subsequent Constitutional Developments
Thus far, we have looked at textual and structural arguments that could have been (and in many cases were) made in the Founding era. But do more recent changes to the Constitution reinforce or undermine these arguments?
The Tiventy-Fifth Amendment.
The enactment of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment in 1967 makes our structural attack on section 19 even more forceful. The Twenty-Fifth Amendment provides, among other things, a means of filling a vice-presidential vacancy. As we have already noted, the original Constitution did not give a President any authority to replace a Vice President who died or left office. 86. Brown & Cinquegrana, supra note 20, at 1419; see also FEacK, supra note 20, at 90 n.t (describing "lame duck" sessions of Congress between election and commencement of the new term and the long gap between the beginning of the new term and the seating of the new Congress); Hamlin, supra note 43, at 183 (noting historical reality that at times both offices of Speaker and President pro tempore have been vacant); Silva, supra note 13, at 452 nA (describing nine-month lapses in congressional sessions).
87. Consider, in this regard, the shrewd remarks of two of the most able men at the Philadelphia Convention: James Wilson and James Madison. In response to early proposals that put the Chief Senator next in line for a vacant Presidency and also gave the Senate a role in presidential selection, Wilson worried that the Senate "might have an interest in throwing dilatory obstacles in the way" of presidential selection. 93 Here too, our concern that a conflict of interest may lead to harmful legislative foot-dragging reflects not abstract fanciful fears, but actual historical experience. It took a Democratically controlled Congress no less than 121 days to confirm Republican Nelson Rockefeller as Vice President in 1974. 95 Had something happened to Republican President Gerald Ford during this four month window, Democrat Speaker Carl Albert would have moved into the Oval Office under section 19.
Granted, Rockefeller's questionable financial dealings raised genuine issues about his fitness to serve as either Vice President or President. 96 But the 1947 Act created bad incentives for Congress to string things out, rather than deliberate with dispatch and then vote up or down on Rockefeller. 97 Even if the con-90. U.S. CoNsr amend. XXV, § 2 (emphasis added). 91. See Brown & Cinquegrana, supra note 20, at 1403-04 & nn.55-57, 1414-15 (demonstrating the dangers of partisan politics disrupting the confirmation process and suggesting reform through either limiting confirmation participants to members of the President's party or mandating a time limit on the confirmation process).
92. Though § 19 was on the books when the Twenty-Fifth Amendment was adopted, nothing in the Amendment's text or structure bestows any special constitutional blessing on § 19. To the contrary, as we argue, the very structure of the Amendment undermines the § 19 scheme. 93 flicts of interest created by the Act never actually affected congressional behavior here, and in fact did not slow things down one bit, the Act still contributed to the appearance of a self-dealing slowdown. In this respect, the 1947 Act repeated the mistake of the Act of 1792, which created the appearance of impropriety when Ben Wade voted to convict Andrew Johnson in 1868, even though Johnson had in fact done things that raised real doubts about his fitness for the Presidency.
Another section of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment creates further opportunity for legislative self-dealing, should legislators be permitted to succeed to the Presidency. Section 4 of the Amendment allows the Vice President, together with a majority of either the Cabinet or such other body as Congress designates, to certify to the Congress that the President is unable to discharge his duties. 98 This certification can effectively remove the President from office until the disability passes, making the Vice President Acting President. 9 9 Of course, a President alleged to be disabled might disagree, and the Twenty-Fifth Amendment allows him to communicate such disagreement to Congress. In such a case, Section 4 makes the two houses of Congress the ultimate judges of the President's fitness for service.' 0 0 To the extent the legislative leaders rank high up in the succession line, their final arbitration of such executive department disputes may be infected by a direct and immediate conflict of interest. Here again, permitting legislative succession creates the possibility that legislators will judge their own cases. Moreover, Cabinet officials face very different strategic incentives than do legislators. Consider a bad-faith Cabinet official cynically considering whether to deem an able President disabled to push himself one notch higher on the succession chain. If the able President can convince a mere one-thirdplus-one of either House of her fitness, she will resume the reins and can immediately dismiss the badfaith official. Under the Amendment, by contrast, cynical legislators face neither this uncertainty about whether the President will prevail (since they rule at the end), nor the prospect of immediate dismissal.
Also, in ruling against a disabled President, the collective Cabinet does not anoint itself an electoral college: As a group, it may not designate its favorite Cabinet member "Secretary of State" and thus next in line in the same way that each House may pick its favorite as the section 19 "Officer." Finally, Cabinet officers, unlike Congress members, are typically handpicked by and work closely with the President whose fitness is now in question; thus they are likely to be both loyal and knowledgeable about any possible disability. SILVA, supra note 74, at 108. The Cabinet's special access to and knowledge of the President's true status may be crucial in many disability cases. In the end, this unique knowledge may outweigh any indirect self-dealing concerns raised by Cabinet succession.
The populist Presidency.
Finally, we should take note of a powerful post-Founding development in American constitutionalism: the rise of a populist, plebiscitarian Presidency. At first, this trend might seem to support legislative succession-Representatives and Senators (after the Seventeenth Amendment) are directly elected by the people, but Cabinet officials are not. The People's President today, the argument runs, should be elected, not appointed; thus, legislators, not Cabinet officials, should head the succession lineup.
But the President is elected by a national electorate; Congressmen are not. They represent the parts, not the whole. Of course, the Speaker and the President pro tempore are chosen as leaders by their respective Houses, which do span the country; but a Cabinet official is appointed by the President and then confirmed by the Senate. Thus, in contrast to the Speaker or President pro tempore, a Cabinet official can claim selection by two continental institutions, and a mandate from the most truly national institution (the Presidency). Moreover, only he can claim apostolic succession from the very person whose presidential term ended prematurely.
This last idea-handpicked succession-is especially important. A modem Vice President who moves up to the Oval Office derives his mandate largely from the fact that he is the handpicked successor of the fallen President.
8
Because the People on Election Day are not given a chance to cast separate votes for the Vice President, he lacks apersonal electoral mandate. Instead, the Vice President derives his mandate from the populist President who chose him as both running mate and heir apparent.' 0 9 The Twenty-Fifth Amendment formalizes the notion of handpicked succession, empowering the President to nominate her chosen heir, subject to congressional approval. 110 Cabinet succession simply extends this modem model of handpicked succession to the next level of contingency: In the event of double death, the Oval Office will still pass to a person handpicked by the President as her (contingent) successor. (If none of the existing Cabinet offices is deemed appropriate for this ex officio role as contingent successor, a new executive office of "First Secretary" could be explicitly created with duties designed to provide the officer with suitable training for the Presidency, and with a nomination and confirmation process focusing directly on the express role of contingent successor.)"'
In general, this model of "apostolic" legitimacy will tend to preserve party and policy continuity: The party that won the People's vote of confidence on Election Day will continue to govern the White House. Legislative succession, by contrast, can defy the People's presidential verdict, awarding the White House to the party that decisively lost the Presidency on Election Day.
12 This is an especially grave problem under current law, since statutory succession does not trigger an interim election.' 3 As we have seen, congressional elections cannot substitute for presidential ones. Even if they could, section 19 can defy the people's will on Congressional Election Day. A Speaker who loses his district in an off-year November election, and whose party goes down to defeat nationally, will still become President-for more than two years!-if the Oval Office becomes vacant in 108. See SH.,VA, supra note 74, at 156-57. mid-November, December, or early January. Thus, when fully considered, the modem rise of political parties and a populist Presidency does not undercut, but in fact buttresses, the case against legislative succession.
II. THE STATUTORY EVOLUTION
Given the powerful textual, historical, and structural arguments identified above, how could Congress have ever enacted 3 U.S.C. section 19? To answer this question, and to understand the evolution of the federal succession statute, we must go back to the earliest version, enacted in 1792.114 One major faction of the Second Congress wanted the Secretary of State to follow the Vice President in the succession order. 115 118. Act of Mar. 1, 1792, ch. 8, § 9, 1 Stat. 239, 240 (repealed 1886). 119. Two other (ultimately unsatisfactory) notions may have made it seem natural or appropriate to place the President pro tempore next in line. First, the Senate, in some ways, resembles an executive council, playing a role in advising on, as well as consenting to, executive appointments and treatymaking. See U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. Cf. WooD, supra note 13, at 138-39 (noting that in most colonial governments, but not in early revolutionary state constitutions, the upper branch of the legislature also served as the governor's council). But this vision of the Senate contradicts the strong separation of executive and legislative personnel embodied in revolutionary state constitutions and in the Incompatibility Clause of the federal Constitution. See id. at 138 (noting criticism of early colonial councils which mixed legislative and magisterial duties); see generally Calabresi & Larsen, supra note 9 (discussing the Incompatibility Clause's role in maintaining separation of powers).
Second, some in Congress believed that since the Vice President-the er officio Senate President--succeeds a fallen President, the next official in line should be the Vice President's replacement as Senate presider: the President pro tempore. Indeed, Roger Sherman (wrongly) thought that the President pro tempore, following Vice Presidential ascension, would himself become Vice President. See 2 Aa A.S oF CoNG. 1903 (Jan. 10, 1791), 1912 (Jan. 13, 1791). Sherman's textual mistake mirrors his structural myopia: Unlike the Vice President, the President pro tempore formally represents but a single state. His ascension to the Presidency would thus raise distinct issues of state favoritism and disuniformity. See note 25 supra and accompanying text. And to remain in office, a Senator (unlike a Vice President) might need to win state reelection in an off-year election. This would have made the Acting President of the United States dependent on a single state legislature.
Once the decision was made to put the President pro tempore at the top of the Succession Act list, notions of bicameralism may have argued for the Speaker's placement next in line. But see 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 281 (Dec. 22, 1791) (remarks of Rep. Gerry) ("[H]e hoped that the House would never consent to making their Speaker an amphibious animal."). Gerry did support the inclusion of the President pro tempore in the Succession Act. See id. at 302-03 (Jan. 2, 1792). Thus he appears to have believed that the Senate was already "amphibious"--mixing executive and legislative functions (but not The 1792 Act does have one other noteworthy aspect: a provision for an immediate national presidential election in the event the succession statute is triggered.
12 1 The "Officer" who assumed the Presidency under the Act would do so only for as long as was necessary to conduct a new election. This special election procedure squares perfectly with the Constitution's Succession Clause, which empowers Congress to specify an Acting President to serve "until... a President shall be elected,"' 2 2 without explicitly insisting that the country wait for a regular quadrennial election. Indeed, at the Philadelphia Convention, James Madison took special pains to ensure that the Succession Clause was worded to accommodate the possibility of an "intermediate election of the President." 23 And at the Virginia ratifying convention, he made public assurances that in the event of double death, "the election of another President will immediately take place."' 124 As we urge in greater detail below, this "special election" provision should be resurrected today. 125 In repealing the 1792 Act with the Act of 1886, Congress implemented a succession scheme that excluded members of Congress, providing instead for Cabinet succession. 1 26 The 1886 Act also gave Congress discretion on whether personnel) in its "Advice and Consent" concerning appointments and treatymaking-in ways the House to call a special presidential election. 131. McGregor leaned heavily on the early Congress' interpretation of the Succession Clause, as reflected in the Act of 1792. Such strong reliance on early congressional interpretations, infected by political self-dealing, is misplaced. See note 120 supra and accompanying text. Moreover, the 1792 and the 1947 Acts differed in key ways. The 1947 Act explicitly required an ascending legislator to resign his legislative leadership, but the 1792 Act maintained a pointed silence on this. Several lav'makers who voted for the 1792 Act apparently thought that resignation was not required. This judgment is obviously unconstitutional, see text accompanying notes 34-35 supra, and thus provides little comfort to supporters of the 1947 Act. Other early legislators may have believed that the Constitution did indeed require resignation, but they failed to come to grips with the unique practical and constitutional problems created by resignation. See notes 30-49 supra and accompanying text. In short, by faling to explicitly address the resignation dilemma that Madison posed, see note 143 infra, the Second Congress simply evaded the key analytic issue, and thus the Act is entitled to little weight as a considered constitutional judgment. (And, of course, no statutory succession ever took place under the 1792 Act--or has yet to take place under the 1947 Act-and so the practical slate remains relatively clean.)
McGregor also stressed the breadth of the word "Officer" in the Succession Clause, but he failed to address the textual and structural criticisms of that construction raised in this article. 
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HeinOnline --48 Stan. L. Rev. 134 1995-1996 omitted-over President Truman's objection-any provision for an immediate election should the succession act be triggered. 132 Other provisions of section 19 of the 1947 Act have created additional constitutional and practical problems. First, section 19 provides that a Cabinet officer who assumes the Presidency after the Speaker and President pro tempore have passed up their chance can later be "bumped" out of the Oval Office if either legislator changes his mind or is replaced by a new legislative leader. 133 Bumping creates huge problems of logistics and fosters gamesmanship.' 3 4 It also seems to violate the plain meaning of the Constitution. 137 To make matters even fishier, only congressional leaders can bump under section 19; a higher ranking Cabinet officer cannot bump a lower ranking officer once the latter has assumed the office of Acting President. This selective bumping smacks of legislative self-dealing.
Second, the 1947 Act requires any Cabinet officer who ascends to resign his Cabinet post in order to act as President.' 38 Consider the case where the Vice Presidency is vacant and the President becomes temporarily disabledsay, an operation will put her out of action for an anticipated two weeks. Neither the Speaker nor the President pro tempore is likely to resign his legislative seat to act as President for a mere two weeks-and, as we have seen, the Incompatibility Clause demands this resignation. 139 The ball, therefore, now bounces into the Secretary of State's court. Section 19 forces him to give up his State Department post in order to act as President; and once the disabled President recovers and resumes the reins, the Secretary will regain his post only by rerunning the nomination and confirmation gauntlet. This hardly seems a fitting reward for a good and faithful public servant. The Act of 1886 did not require Cabinet resignation; on the contrary, as discussed earlier, many of its backers believed that a Cabinet officer must keep his post to act as President.
140
In short, legislative debates over the centuries do little to refute the force of our analysis in this article. Once, in 1886, Congress denied itself; and twice, in 1792 and 1947, Congress favored its own. Constitutionally, Congress' self-denial was a far, far better thing than its self-dealing.
III. THE BURDEN OF PERSUASION
In the end, the question is not just whose reading of the Succession Clause is best. We must bear in mind the factual contexts in which succession becomes an issue. Statutory succession provisions are triggered by events that rock the very foundations of the country's political and social stability. Constitutional faiths, too, are at stake during these periods of crisis. The need for a smooth, orderly, lawful, ethical, and uncontroversial transition of power is at its peak. Precisely because our nation needs to instill confidence in the constitutional rule of law, we establish succession schemes before the need to use them should arise. 141 We should devise and construe these schemes to minimize the self-dealing opportunities and logistical glitches that will threaten any successor President's legitimacy at home and abroad. In implementing the Succession Clause, we should steer wide of any sizeable constitutional or ethical challenges. Even a little uncertainty about the legitimacy or constitutionality of a presidential successor makes an already sad situation unacceptably worse. 142 Thus, if our constitutional criticisms of section 19 merely inspire serious doubt about the current succession scheme, those criticisms become winners because of the stakes involved. In fact, as we have seen, these criticisms are more than substantial. The most straightforward reading of the Constitution's text, the clear implication of five related yet distinct structural themes, and the spirit of twentieth century developments all point to the same conclusion: Legislators are not "Officers" under the Succession Clause. 14 3 And if this is so, Congress should act now rather than risk a national crisis when tragedy suddenly strikes.
We also believe that a sensible modem day succession statute should provide for a prompt national election should events trigger statutory succession. On this point, we recommend reenactment of some form of the 1792 Act's Rep[resentatives] proposed to substitute the Secretary of State, but the Senate disagreed, [and] there being much delicacy in the matter it was not pressed by the former. Letter from James Madison to Edmund Pendleton, supra note 20, at 235-36. With remarkable grace and pith, Madison thus set the stage for much of our analysis today.
To the extent that Professor Manning disagrees with us (and with Madison) we are unpersuaded. The Constitution must mean something-the best reading of the document either permits or bars legislative succession. Manning tries to raise doubts about our reading, but fails to weave together a coherent set of arguments that a contrary reading is equally or more plausible overall. Some of his objections just don't wash. For example, he criticizes our reading of the term "officer" as the least natural textually,.but fails to see that the most "natural" textual reading is one that accounts for a provision's place in the larger constitutional structure. (This error, and others, would have been more evident had he in fact tried to make the affumative case for legislative succession.)
Manning's key suggestion is that an Acting President is not, as such, an "Officer of the United To avoid the terrifying Scylla of an utterly unaccountable President-a nonofficer officer-Manning lurches toward Charybdis. On his account, a Speaker remains Acting President only by retaining his Speakership and thus the support of a House majority. Manning, supra, at 146 n.29. But this simply creates a Parliamentary Prime Minister eligible to preside simultaneously at both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue, and removable at will by a mere majority of the House. Indeed, to stay in the Oval Office, the Speaker must win reelection in his district in an off-year election. All this makes sense in a Parliamentary system, but the idea that the Nation's President should be dependent on the will of a single district is anathema to our Constitution. These huge structural anomalies are not de minimis when they happen, and Manning's approach makes them more likely to happen ex ante. The warped incentives created by legislative succession can cause double vacancies by encouraging groundless impeachments and unreasonable delays in filling vice-presidential vacancies. Manning's exigency is not exogenous. (And special elections cannot cure this, since they are not required by the Constitution, or even by the 1947 Act.)
To support this radical Prime Ministerialization of America, Manning points to the Vice Presidency. Manning, supra, at 148-50. But the plain language of the Constitution prevents a Vice President/Acting President from blending executive and legislative leadership by simultaneously presiding at both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue. See note 48 supra; text accompanying notes 32 & 56 supra. And unlike Manning's Speaker, the Vice President/Acting President cannot be ousted merely because a bare House majority decides at any point that they don't like him, instead, he is removable only if impeached and convicted of "high crimes and misdemeanors." Manning also ignores other key differences between Vice President and Senators. See note 119 supra. Thus, he is left in the awkward position of(properly) admitting that a Virginia governor may not act as President, but (oddly) suggesting that a Virginia Senator may so act, even though the Senator may have to win reelection in Virginia to remain in the Oval Office.
Manning also leans heavily on the self-dealing Act of 1792, but early Acts cannot repeal clear constitutional principles. (Otherwise, the infamous Sedition Act of 1798 repealed the First Amendment.) Here, the structural arguments were not, on balance, close in 1792. And we reject Manning's muffled claim that an amendment passed in the 1960s somehow retroactively changed the fact that special election device. If, God forbid, a bomb were to go off at the inaugural celebration, the People of the United States should not be stuck for four years with a President they did not elect-a President who, indeed, may represent a party they decisively rejected on Election Day. 14 4 Provision for a special election should be fixed in advance in a succession statute, rather than left to congressional discretion after statutory succession has occurred. On this single point, the Act of 1792 was far better than the Act of 1886, which effectively gave Congress discretion to determine the term of a successor President. Such discretion is very much in keeping with a British Parliamentary model, but not with the structural separation of powers established by the American Constitution. 145
144. Under our proposal, the interim President elected in a special election would merely serve out the remainder of the regular term; the regular rhythm of quadrennial Leap Year elections would remain undisturbed. Some have argued that because a President must serve a four-year term under the language of Article II, Section 1, Clause 1 ("[the President] shall hold his Office during the Term of four Years"), a specially elected President must be elected for a new four year term. E.g., FEaauc, supra note 20, at 146 (noting that it was assumed during debates over the 1886 Act that special election would result in a four-year term for the new successor President-elect); Silva, supra note 13, at 474-75 (stating that most scholars conclude that a special election must result in a new four-year term). Such arguments misread the Term Clause by applying it beyond its intended scope. The clause specifies the standard term of an ordinarily elected President, but it does not apply to specially elected Presidents. Precisely because, contrary to the Term Clause, a prior President did not "hold his Office during the Term of four years," Congress may call a special election to complete the prior President's term, rather than to begin a new one. Similarly, a Vice President who, after the death of a President, himself "become[s] President" under the Twenty-Fifth Amendment does not begin his own new four-year term but merely completes his predecessor's term. And a person who becomes Vice President under Section 2 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment likewise serves out the remainder of her predecessor's term rather than a new four-year term. This reading preserves the permanent synchronization of presidential and congressional elections, an important part of the constitutional system in place over the last two centuries.
The precise timing of the special election poses the following dilemma: we must allow enough time for grieving, campaigning, and choosing, but the more time allowed for all this, the less time left in the original four-year term. See FasiucK supra note 65, at 222. Assuming that a proper special election could be conducted within six or seven months of statutory succession, such an extra election would make sense only if succession occurred within the first two-and-a-half years of a regular presidential term.
Some have argued that, since a proper presidential election requires a simultaneous vice-presidential election, Section 2 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment effectively repealed the Founders' special election option: A statutory successor President, the argument runs, can nominate a new Vice President, who, once confirmed, cannot be ousted from office until the next quadrennial election. FEEaucK, supra note 65, at 226. This argument invites three big criticisms. First, the Twenty-Fifth Amendment sharply distinguishes between the powers of a true "President" and those of an "Acting President." See U.S. CoNsT. amend. XXV, § 3. Only a "President" can nominate under Section 2. And, strictly speaking, a statutory successor is not a true President, but only an "Officer ... act[ing] as President" under the Succession Clause-an "Acting President" within the meaning of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment. Contra Brown & Cinquegrana, supra note 20, at 1405 n.60, 1441-44 (arguing that an Acting President has discretion to nominate a new Vice President). Second, even if a statutory Acting President can invoke Section 2, it is hard to see how he could do more than nominate an Acting Vice President whose tenure would track his own. Since his own tenure is clearly limited by the special election option, so too with the tenure of his Acting Vice President. (This preserves Article It's requirement that a President and his Vice President serve the "same Term.' U.S. CoNsT., art. II, § 1, cl. I (emphasis added).) Third, a special presidential election need not mirror a regular quadrennial election in every respect. Just as a special election may be for a short "residue" term, perhaps it may also depart from tradition and be a "President-only" election if the Vice Presidency were somehow deemed "filled" under Section 2.
145. See Hamlin, supra note 43, at 192-93.
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HeinOnline --48 Stan. L. Rev. 138 [1995] [1996] If, as we strongly urge, Congress ever revisits presidential succession, two additional items cry out for legislative solution. First, Congress should provide for various scenarios of prepresidential death or disability. What if a leading candidate dies or becomes disabled right before Election Day? Or if the Election Day winner, the de facto President elect, dies or becomes disabled before the electoral college meets? Or if the electoral college winner dies or becomes disabled before the electoral votes are counted in Congress? A sensible legislative solution would postpone elections in the event of a candidate's death before Election Day, but would treat the Election Day winner as de facto President elect, whose death should trigger the same apostolic succession rules applicable in postInauguration scenarios. In light of our textual, structural, political, practical, and ethical concerns about section 19, we suggest that Speaker Gingrich might do well to consider adding one more item to his already crowded reform agenda: amendment of the problematic statute that might one day make him President, but might not make him legitimate or even constitutional.1 47 146. For elaboration of the details of such a legislative solution, see Amar, supra note 110, at 222-38.
147. For the record, we voiced similar concerns well before Newt Gingrich ever became Speaker. See Amar & Amar, supra note 1, at 914 & n.4, 943-44, 946-47 (criticizing schemes that might award the Presidency to someone who lacks a national electoral mandate); Amar, supra note 110, at 237 n.30 (reflecting ideas presented in a symposium held in April 1994 and in testimony given before the U.S.
Senate in February 1994
).
